SYSTEM FOR ENSURING CONFIDENTIALITY OF DATA TRANSACTIONS USING ZERO DISCLOSURE PROTOCOLS

Abstract

The paper addresses the problem of ensuring transaction data confidentiality in modern distributed information systems, including blockchain networks, financial platforms, and inter-organizational transaction environments. It is shown that traditional cryptographic mechanisms focused on channel encryption or data storage protection do not provide a balance between public transaction verifiability and concealment of internal transaction semantics. To overcome this limitation, a system-based approach to transaction confidentiality using zero-knowledge proof protocols zk-SNARKs and zk-STARKs is proposed.

An architecture of a transaction confidentiality assurance system is developed, within which a formal transaction model is defined by separating public parameters from private data. A mechanism for generating and verifying cryptographic proofs of transaction correctness without disclosing sensitive information is described. A generalized zero-knowledge transaction model is introduced, enabling verification of predefined constraints based on formally provable cryptographic evidence. The characteristics of zk-SNARKs and zk-STARKs are analyzed in the context of the proposed system, and a comparative evaluation is performed considering proof size, computational costs, initialization requirements, and cryptographic resilience.

The study demonstrates that integrating both protocols within a unified architectural framework enables adaptive selection of proof mechanisms depending on transaction characteristics and execution environment constraints. The obtained results confirm that the proposed system outperforms existing solutions in terms of confidentiality level, verification reliability, and architectural flexibility. The proposed approach provides a practical foundation for deploying zero-knowledge-based confidentiality mechanisms in real-world distributed transaction processing systems.